Nicholas AndreouBarrister, Victorian Bar

Patrick Corporation v Toll Holdings [2005] VSC 392

Supreme Court of Victoria, 3 October 2005. Dodds-Streeton J.

In the Supreme Court of Victoria, Dodds-Streeton J held on an originating motion that a director's letter after a board meeting had closed validly required reconsideration under the deadlock clause (sub-clause 13.1) of the Pacific National shareholders' agreement, because the clause did not require the initial meeting to be adjourned and allowed minor amendments leaving the resolution's substantive subject matter unchanged [6], [34], [104], [133], [134], [136], [137].

What the court decided

Patrick and Toll subsidiaries each owned 50% of the issued shares in the joint venture company Pacific National [13]. Sub-clause 13.1(a) allowed any director, where the board was unable to agree on a resolution, to require that the matter be adjourned to a subsequent meeting [53]. That meeting could not take place earlier than 1 month after the meeting at which the resolution was initially considered [53]. If the directors remained unable to agree at the adjourned meeting, either shareholder could by notice invoke a deadlock-breaking mechanism, subject to the conditions in paragraph (c) [53]. That mechanism could ultimately lead to the sale of the joint venture company's business [2].

At the board meeting on 1 September 2005 the Toll nominated directors voted against a resolution supported by the Patrick nominated directors, so it was not passed [28]. It was undisputed that no director then required that its subject matter or the meeting be adjourned [34]. On 2 September 2005 Patrick's solicitors forwarded to Toll a notice under sub-clause 13.1(b) [35]. At trial the plaintiffs did not maintain that a mere failure to pass a resolution entitled a shareholder to serve such a notice [58]. Mr Corrigan was one of the Patrick Rail nominated directors of Pacific National [16]. On 14 September 2005 he wrote to the other three directors [43]. That letter convened a board meeting for 4 October 2005 [136]. The accompanying notice enclosed a resolution amended principally to describe the advisers to be instructed as "independent" [44]. The plaintiffs sought declarations by amended summons on originating motion [6].

Toll argued that a director had to require, at the initial meeting, that both the resolution and the meeting be adjourned [68], [71]. It also argued that, in the absence of agreement, only the identical resolution could be put at the later meeting [73].

In her Honour's view, the words "subsequent meeting" indicated a new meeting, not a continuation of the initial meeting by its adjournment [95]. A single director could not adjourn a board meeting, which required the unanimous agreement of the directors present and entitled to vote [96]. Her Honour rejected Toll's argument that the other directors were obliged to agree to an adjournment, saying such a process would have been expressly set out [97], [98].

Toll said its construction was needed to give at least one month's notice that the mechanism might be invoked [108]. Her Honour said that the construction of a contractual provision should not be dictated by the aim of excluding possible abuse for ulterior purposes [113]. The usual minimum of three business days' notice for board meetings applied even to the most serious matters [115]. The mechanism also prescribed at least six weeks for discussion and attempts to resolve the deadlock [117]. Even if the second meeting were an adjourned meeting, the minimum one month period would run from the meeting at which the resolution was initially considered [105]. In this case that period would begin to run on 1 September 2005 [119].

Her Honour held that the different term "matter" was not a synonym for the resolution but was of wider reach [126]. Though it was unnecessary to decide, and counsel for both parties took a contrary view, she was not persuaded that a failure to agree must always be shown by a resolution put and not passed [126]. The term "matter" meant the substantive underlying subject matter of the resolution on which there had been a failure to agree [132]. The amendments clarified the independent status of the advisers and did not otherwise alter the resolution's substance [134]. Her Honour accepted that the wording of sub-clause 13.1(b) supported Toll, but held that it took its content from sub-clause 13.1(a), which spoke of "the matter" [135].

Her Honour held that Mr Corrigan's letter and notice were a requirement under sub-clause 13.1(a) and that the meeting convened for 4 October 2005 was the adjourned meeting within sub-clause 13.1(b) [136]. The plaintiffs were therefore entitled to the relief they sought [137].

Why it matters

The decision gives an imperfectly drafted deadlock clause a commercially sensible operation rather than a technical reading of "adjourn" [131]. Drafters of joint venture agreements should state expressly when a deadlock requirement must be made, whether the same resolution must be put again and what notice is required. The result turned on the particular words of one imperfectly drafted clause [88].

Numbers in square brackets are paragraph numbers of the judgment. This note summarises a decided case for education and is not legal advice. See how the notes are written.